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The paper discusses the issues involved in decentralization process in Croatia. 
Although it has become the most favoured reform policy priority among the 
Croatian politicians of all options, the values of indicators of fiscal 
decentralization confirm the fact that it has been achieved at a very law degree. 
The paper outlines characteristics of Croatian system of fiscal decentralization 
and measures that are necessary for successful implementation and realization of 
the benefits associated with fiscal decentralization. The conclusions in this paper 
are based on the analysis of the division of functional responsibilities and 
revenues across levels of government and on calculation of widely used measures 
for the estimation of the degree of decentralization. The paper concludes with a 
re-emphasis on the importance of execution of decentralization process in a way 
that it ensures financial autonomy of local units so that they have sufficient 
revenues needed for the realization of delegated functions. 
Keywords: decentralization, expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, 











In the recent decades, fiscal decentralization has emerged as a trend 
worldwide. This trend can be seen in the developed as well as in developing 
countries. There is diversity in degree of decentralization across the world but 
concern is that there is problem in defining and measuring the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. In fact, how decentralization is measured depends on how it is 
defined. Yet, there is no consensus on the precise definition of decentralization 
and due to complexity of intergovernmental relations that encompass many 
dimensions there is no single quantitative measure for measuring the degree and 
evaluating the outcomes of decentralization process.  
Decentralization is a complex and multifaceted concept that comprises 
fiscal, political and administrative dimension. In short, it means distribution of 
responsibilities and sources of funds. Lower governmental units carry out matters 
of local importance through which the needs of citizens are met directly. The 
decentralization process includes the devolution of responsibility for public 
outlays, revenues and transfers by the central government to lower government 
levels. Significant increase in the financial capacity and fiscal autonomy of local 
self-government units is understood. 
The process of fiscal decentralization in Croatia started quite recently, in 
2001.  Having a priority to set up modern state and defend occupied territory, the 
dominant approach during and after the Croatian War of Independence was 
centralization of public administration. Political decentralization process started 
after the war with constitutional and legislative reforms, the development of 
pluralistic political parties and representative governments that gave citizens and 
their elected representatives more power in public decision-making. As a 
candidate country for the accession into EU, Croatia has adjusted legal 
framework for local self-government to the requirements established in the 
European Charter of local self-government. However, the question does it 
succeed to implement decentralization in practice and how successfully still 
remains.  
In 2001 administrative and fiscal decentralization begun, together with 
the redistribution of authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing 
public services among different levels of government. After analyzing territorial 
division, legal and organizational framework, the paper examines the various 
dimensions in which phenomenon of decentralization has its effect: the 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities and revenue sources to different 
government levels, intergovernmental fiscal transfers and sub-national borrowing. 
The conclusions point out main obstacles for the successful implementation of 
fiscal decentralization in Croatia, offering some proposals for following steps 
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2. TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF REGIONAL AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CROATIA 
Croatian territory is administratively divided into 577 local and regional 
self-government units of which 127 are towns/cities and 429 municipalities, 
which belong to 21 counties. Counties are established as second level units; they 
are both parts of the system of state administration and local self-government 
units. The capital of Croatia, Zagreb, has a specific status and is considered both a 
(capital) town and a county. 
One hundred and eighty local units have status of regions of special 
national concern. Law on regions of special national concern (OG 26/03) 
distinguishes three groups of regions that enjoy special tax treatment and other 
privileges, in order to diminish consequences of Croatian War of Independence, 
encourage uniform demographic and economic development of the entire 
territory of the Republic of Croatia. One hundred and eleven 
municipalities/towns that belong to the first and second group are areas that still 
suffer war consequences. The third group of areas of special national concern 
consists of 69 municipalities/towns that are classified according to four criteria: 
economic development, demographic situation, structural difficulties and a 
special criterion (mined areas and areas that have additional development 
difficulties). The same privileges enjoy 45 municipalities located in the hill and 
mountain areas. Special government measures are applied for insular areas as 
well. 
Total number of 577 local government units indicates the fragmentation 
problem, which has inevitable negative consequences such as higher costs of 
service provision, due to the non-exploitation of economies of scale and the 
provision of a smaller range of public services. Further, disparities of social, 
economic and demographic conditions are noticeable among jurisdictions and 
they influence their fiscal capacity and ability to deliver services. Such 
administration has reduced their average size as well as the number of 
inhabitants. Consequently, such process resulted in their inefficiency because of 
an increased number of communes whose finances, staff and organization are not 
capable to provide local public services.  
The fact that only 53 (20 counties, the city of Zagreb and  23  
municipalities  and  cities)   of total 577 local government units,  have assumed  
the  obligation  of  financing  the  decentralized  functions confirm the thesis of 
this paper that the decentralization process is not successfully implemented in 
Croatia and that the need for new reform is priority It is interesting that these 53 
local government units, that assumed the financing of the decentralized functions, 
participate with 70-80% in total revenues of all local government units.1  
                                                 
1 Annual Report  for 2007, Ministry of finance, Zagreb, 2008, p. 87. ( available on www.mfin.hr) 
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The large number of local units makes it impossible for the central 
government to get a realistic picture of their financial capacity. According to the 
Article 5 of the Law on Local and Regional Self-government, every place that 
satisfies the formal criterion of a population of 10,000 can become a city so there 
are cities that are incapable of either of financing their expenditure or of 
providing the basic services that are statutory stipulated. That is the reason why 
do they depend on direct transfers from the national Budget. 
There is still trend toward the foundation of new local units. 
Unfortunately, they tend not to be founded on a realistic estimation of their fiscal 
capacity. Changes in the number of local government units are inevitable. 
Solutions to fragmentation problem can be: amalgamation (merging smaller 
units into a bigger one), contracting out services between government units and 




3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DECENTRALIZATION 
PROCESS IN CROATIA 
The process of fiscal decentralization in Croatia has started quite 
recently, in 2001. After the war and the Constitution it was necessary to 
undertake significant steps in democratization process through the adoption of 
legal provisions which were important for establishment of the system of local 
autonomy and implementation of the first local elections, which gave citizens and 
their elected representatives more power in public decision making. Further 
reform was continued with changes in legislation that were introduced during 
2001 by the amendments to the Constitution and enactment of the new Law on 
Local and Regional Self-government (LLRSG) which were adjusted to the 
provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-government. 
As a member state of the Council of Europe, Croatia ratified the 
European Charter of Local Self-government on September 19th, 1997. The 
European Charter of Local Self-Government is the first multilateral legal 
instrument that sets a minimum of basic principles of government that any 
democratic system of local self-government should include. It provides basic 
standards for the effective operation of local self-government, as well as 
standards guaranteeing the political, administrative and financial independence of 
local authorities. The Charter was created by the Council of Europe at the 
initiative of the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of 
Europe and it was opened for signatures on October 15th, 1985. 2 
 
                                                 
2 Mušec, M., Pigey, J., Compliance of the Croatian Legislative Framework with the European Charter 
of Local Self-government, USAID, The Urban Institute, Zagreb, 2005., p. 9- 10. 
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Countries that join the Charter have the obligation to apply minimum set 
of provisions of the Charter in their legislation. Taking into consideration 
diversity of legal systems, political tradition and local government structures of 
signatory states, countries are given a degree of choice. According to the Article 
12 of the Charter the Parties are required to subscribe to at least 20 of 30 
paragraphs of Part I, including at least 10 from a nucleus of 14 basic principles. 
Croatian legislation is essentially in compliance with the key 
requirements and provisions from the Charter but still not with all. Further 
improvements must be done in provision of legal instruments for improvement in 
local government’s autonomy in exercising delegated powers and raising 
revenues from own sources. 
On 9th December 2004 Croatian government passed Framework Program 
for Decentralisation of Republic of Croatia from 2004 to 2007. With this 
Document Croatian Government clearly stated that reform of local and regional 
self-government ranked among its priorities, and that development of local 
democracy was one of the key government tasks in next several years. After the 
last Parliamentary elections, in November 2007, Croatia's new ruling coalition 
signed a Coalition Agreement after reconciliation of basic objectives in The 
Program of the Government of the Republic of Croatia for the 2008-2011 3. One 
of the main Government goals and forth chapter of The Program is Policy of 
Regional Development and Fiscal Decentralization. The Government committed 
itself to make continuous efforts and propose comprehensive legislative and 
strategic solutions in order to provide an efficient implementation of the 
decentralization process and even the development of the entire territory of the 
Republic of Croatia, as well as the full implementation of the European Local 
Self-Government Charter. 
But still no formal paper has been adopted in the sense of a strategy to 
define the objectives, principles, effects and procedure of decentralization. All 
these elements are to some extend contained in the separate laws and in the bylaw 
regulations.  It is necessary to sign single law which should contain clear and 
specific expenditure assignment, assignment of functional responsibilities and 








                                                 
3 New centre right coalition consists of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Croatian Peasants 
Party (HSS) and the Social Liberal Party (HSLS), the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS). 
The new Government is supported in Parliament by other representatives of non-Croatian minorities 
and by the pensioners' party. 
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4. MANDATORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL AND 
REGIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT UNITS 
From 2001 through the fiscal decentralization process the central 
government transferred responsibilities for financing primary and secondary 
education, health care, social welfare and fire departments to the local 
government units.  
Noticeable is the lack of clear expenditure assignment for counties. They 
have very few exclusive responsibilities. As result occur functions overlapping 
between the central government and sub-national governments. Based on 
provisions of the Law on Local and Regional Self-government, counties, in their 
self-governing scope of authority, are responsible for functions of a regional 
character. Exclusive responsibilities of counties enclose secondary, vocational 
and adult education, maintenance of health and social care facilities and roads in 
their competence. The most important role of the county is to equalize 
development of municipalities and cities within its area and to coordinate the 
interests and views of these units.  
The cities and municipalities deliver more public services than do the 
counties. Within the sphere of competence of their self-government they carry out 
operations of local importance that directly realize the needs of the citizens, and 
that have not been assigned by Constitution to the state bodies.4 This regulation is 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiary5(European Charter, Article 4, 
Paragraph 3) and is mainly applicable on utility services (drinking water supply; 
drainage and treatment of sewage; gas and heat supply; public transport; cleaning; 
deposition of garbage; maintenance of pubic areas; maintenance of unclassified 
roads; retail markets; cemetery and crematorium maintenance; chimney 















                                                 
4 Law on Local and Regional Self-government (O.G. 33/01 and 60/01) 
5 The principle of subsidiary  states that  the best results occur when the responsibility for the function of 
producing public goods are assigned to the lowest level of government capable of performing it.   
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Table 1.  







Communes Cities Counties 
1.General 
public/administrative services 
X  X X X 
2. Defense  X    
3. Law and order X    
4. Education X X X X 
    4.1. Pre-school   X X  
    4.2. Elementary  X X X X 
    4.3. Secondary  X   X 
    4.4. Tertiary (university)  X    
5. Health Care  X   X 
6. Social security and welfare X X X X 
7. Housing and utilities   X X  
8. Recreation, culture and 
religion  
 X X X 
9. Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting and fishing 
X   X 
10. Mining, industry and 
construction  
X X X X 
11. Transport and 
communications  
X X X X 
     11.1. Road transport  X X X X 
     11.2. Rail transport X    
     11.3. Air transport  X    
12. Other economic affairs and 
services  
X X X X 
Source: Author’s systematization 
 
The Law on amendments to the Law on Local and Regional Self-
government (O.G. 129/05) distinguished the scope of activities for municipalities 
and towns, on one side, and large towns and towns that are centers of counties, on 
the other side. It is important to point out that it is prescribed by law that special 
particular laws for certain functions of local and regional competences will 
prescribe activities that large cities and counties are obliged to organize and those 
that they can carry out. The status of large town has the local unit that is 
economic, financial, cultural, health, transport and scientific center of 
development of wider surroundings, that have more than 35.000 inhabitants, and 
towns that are centers of counties. Besides the functions of local importance since 
2005 they carry out some new functions, such as: settlement and environment 
design, zoning and urban planning, utility services, child care, social care, 
improvement of natural environment, consumer protection, primary health care, 
fire-fighting and civil protection. According to the latest regulations large towns 
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and counties’ centers can carry out functions of a county’s sphere of 
competences.  
Besides previously determined functions, counties carry out some new 
functions: maintenance of public roads, issuing building and location permits and 
other acts related to building and implementation of documents of environment 
design for the county area out of the area of a large town. Additionally, 
municipalities, towns and counties carry out functions of government 
administration that are, in special laws delegated, to them, and that are financed 
from the state budget. Sub-national expenditure can be analyzed according to the 




























Source: Author’s systematization according to Ministry of finance data 
Chart 1. Sub-national expenditure according to functional classification, 2007 
 
Chart 1. shows that the most of the expenditure of sub-national units is 
related to housing improvement services, where is dominant expenditure for 
communal services, and community development. Expenditure for the general 
public services is allocated for executive and legislative bodies. Such expenditure 
pattern is typical for unitary states but such importance of economic affairs is 
unusual. It includes local government intervention in the economy and is quite 
substantial, representing 16 percent of total expenditure. It will probably be 
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gradually reduced since it is incompatible with EU rules about the subsidization 
of economic activities. 
The expenditure values related to decentralized functions correspond 
with results of decentralization process and match the fact that central 
government has transferred responsibilities for education, welfare, health care and 
fire protection)  to sub-national units. Expenditure for public order and security 










Use of goods and 





employees       
25%
 
Source: Author’s systematization according to Ministry of finance data 
Chart 2. Economic classification of local and regional budget expenditures, 2007 
 
The economic classification of local and regional budget expenditures, 
shown in chart 2., indicates low expenditure autonomy of Croatian LRSGUs. The 
largest share of total expenditures of local and regional self-government units is 
accounted for expenditures for the purchase of goods and services and labour 
expenditures. Compensation for employees refers to the costs for wages of 
employees in the bodies of local and regional self-government units and for 
wages of employees in the sub-national budget users (employees in museums, 
theatres, libraries, kindergartens etc.). The expenditure for the use of goods and 
services comprise the expenditure necessary for regular functioning of all sub-
national budgets users. Resources are spent for material, energy, public lightning, 
waste disposal and the other services necessary for current maintenance of 
buildings and equipment. 
The relative importance of sub-national levels of government in the provision 
of public goods/services can be measured by the expenditure-GDP ratio or comparing 
the sub-national spending relative to the general government spending. Table 2. shows 
that the relative importance of sub-national government has increased since 2001 when 
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decentralization process started in Croatia. Delegation of public sector functions and 
spending responsibilities to sub-national governments have increased their share in total 
government spending and GDP. 
 
Table 2.  
Sub-national government expenditure, relative to GDP and Consolidated General 
Government Expenditure, 2001-2007 ( in percent) 
 
LG 
Expenditures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
% General 
government 
expenditures 8,4 10,7 11,4 12,5 13,2 13,3 13,7 
% GDP 4,3 5,2 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,9 
Source: Author’s calculation according to Ministry of finance data (Budgets of 
counties, towns and municipalities in total) 
 

































Source: Bauer, H., Rudorf,C., Local Finance in Europe, An Overview 2000/2005, 
Centre for Public Administration Research, Innsbruck, 2006 and Croatian 
Ministry of Finance 
Chart 3. Sub-national expenditure as % of GDP 
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Comparison of Aggregate Expenditures Measures of Fiscal 
Decentralization for EU countries and Croatia are shown in charts 3. and 4. Data 
are available for year 2004. They highlight the differences in sub-national 
expenditure shares. The degree of sub-national expenditure autonomy varies 
significantly among analyzed European countries. There are considerable national 
variations concerning the weight of sub-national expenditure in GDP, which 
ranges from as low as 0,7% in Malta to as high as 33,4% in Denmark. The ratio 
largely depends on the size and the nature of responsibilities entrusted to sub-
national governments. Values are quite extensive in the Nordic countries. On the 
contrary, in Malta, Cyprus, Greece and Luxemburg the responsibilities of sub-
national governments are limited, and so is the weight of their expenditures. 
Croatia is situated quite below the EU average (11,5%). In 2004 sub-national 
expenditure amounted about 5,7% of GDP in Croatia. Those results confirm the 
thesis that Croatia has unitary and relatively centralized system.  
 

































Source: Bauer, H., Rudorf,C., Local Finance in Europe, An Overview 2000/2005, 
Centre for Public Administration Research, Innsbruck, 2006 and Croatian 
Ministry of Finance 
Chart 4. Sub-national expenditure in % of Consolidated General Government 
 
The similar results shown up if sub-national expenditures are compared 
to General Government. The highest shares are evident for the Nordic countries: 
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Denmark (60,5%), Sweden (44,2%) and Finland(38,9%) and for the Ireland 
(42,7%). In Cyprus, Greece and Malta sub-national government is of minor 
importance comparing sub-national expenditures to General Government 
expenditures and amounted less than 6%. 
 
 
5. REVENUE SOURCES OF SUB-NATIONAL UNITS  
The core of decentralization process is that sub-national governments 
need to have revenues that are adequate to finance the expenditures assigned to 
them. Pre-requisite for achieving adequate fiscal capacity is fiscal autonomy of 
sub-national governments in raising revenues from own sources. 
 
Table 3.  
Croatian sub-national government revenue sources, 2007 
 
A1. Own taxes of Counties 
• Inheritance and gifts tax,  
• Tax on road motor vehicles,  
• Tax on vessels,  
• Levy on coin operated machines 
for amusement 
A2. Own taxes of Cities or 
Municipalities 
• Surtax on income tax,  
• Consumption tax,  
• Tax on holiday houses,  
• Tax on trade name,  
• Tax on the use of public lend 
I. Taxes:  
 
B. Shared revenues (joint taxes) 
• Personal Income tax 
• Real estate transfer tax 
II. Grants from: foreign governments, international 
organizations, other general government units 
 
III. Property income 
Interests, Dividends, Withdrawals from 
income of quasi-corporations, Rent 
IV. Sales of goods and services Administrative fees, Incidental sales by non-
market establishments                      
V. Fines, penalties and forfeits  
VI. Voluntary transfers other than 
grants 
 
VII. Borrowing  
Source: Author’s systematization 
 
Local units’ obligation to finance the operations within the sphere of 
their competence with own financial resources and financial resources transferred 
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from the central budget has been regulated in the Law on Financing of Local and 
Regional Self-Government. The Law on Financing of Local and Regional Self-
Government has been changed 11 times since it was passed in 1993. According to 
recent changes in tax revenue sharing, since January 2007, revenues from 
corporate income tax belong to the central state, additional share of income tax 
has increased for units that carry out certain decentralized functions and revenues 
from personal income tax are distributed in a new way.  
Chart 5. shows that in the structure of total sub-national revenues 
realized in 2007 the most important are tax revenues that totaled 59%. The share 
of non-tax revenues comes mostly from administrative and communal fees that 

























Source: Ministry of finance 
Chart 5. Total revenues of 53 sub-national units, in %, 2007 
 
The degree of fiscal autonomy at the sub-national level can be measured 
as the share of own revenues in total revenues. The share of own local taxes is 
very law and the largest share (90%) of the tax revenue of sub-national 
governments in Croatia is collected from the distribution of revenues from shared 
taxes: personal income tax and  corporate income tax until January 2007 (Chart 
6). The fact that the rates of shared taxes are completely determined by central 
government and that there is national determination of the tax base, local 
determination of the tax rates, within nationally determined brackets, and central 
government administration of the own taxes of counties, cities and municipalities, 
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confirm the thesis that there is low fiscal autonomy in Croatia. Only for one kind 
of municipal/city tax-tax on the use of public land, local government determines 



















     Personal income tax and surtax      Corporation Income Tax
     Taxes on property                   Taxes on goods and services              
Source: Author’s systematization according to Ministry of Finance data 
Chart 6. Structure of the tax revenue of 53 sub-national governments, 2006 and 
2007 
 
Such a great reliance on the PIT to finance local government could cause 
a high degree of regional income disparities and difficulties for equalization 
between areas of different income levels. Tax sharing is used as vertical and 
horizontal fiscal equalization instrument. There is a potential risk, if a large share 
of sub-national spending is financed through transfers, mainly in the form of 
shared taxes. Sub-national governments may increase sub-national spending and 
underutilize their own tax base. Reliance on transfers from higher levels of 
government to finance sub-national spending tends to put strain on 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, and deepen budget imbalances at the central 
government level.6  
For analyzing decentralization from the revenue side commonly used 
indicators are sub-national government revenues relative to GDP and relative to 




                                                 
6 de Mello, Jr,L. R., Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: A Cross-Country 
Analysis, , World Development Vol. 28, No. 2, 2000, pp. 376 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XVIII. (2009) BR. 2. (233-258)             Konjhodžić, H., Šuman Tolić, M.:FISCAL... 
 
 247 
Table 4.  
Sub-national government revenues, relative to GDP and Consolidated General 
Government Revenues in Croatia, 2001-2007 ( in percent) 
 
LG Revenues 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
% General Government 
Revenues 8,7 14,3 15,3 15,4 16,0 16,6 17,1 
% GDP 4,1 6,6 7,1 7,2 7,1 7,5 7,9 
Source: Author’s calculation according to Ministry of finance data (Budgets of 
counties, towns and municipalities in total) 
 
The revenues of sub-national governments as a percentage of total 
revenues have increased in Croatia from 8,7% in 2001 to 17,1%  in 2007. 
Comparing to GDP sub-national revenues have increased from 4,1% in 2001 to 
7,9% in 2007. Those are data for all local and regional government units in 
Croatia. If we take into account only 53 local units that have assumed the 
obligation of financing the decentralized functions results are even worse. In 2007 
their share in GDP was 5,6% and in General Government Revenues 12,2%. 
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Source: Bauer, H., Rudorf, C., Local Finance in Europe, An Overview 
2000/2005, Centre for Public Administration Research, Innsbruck, 2006 and 
Croatian Ministry of Finance 
Chart 7. Aggregate Revenues Measures of Fiscal Decentralization, 2004 
 
The conclusion drawn from chart 7. is that the amount of local 
government revenue in percentage of GDP varies widely among EU countries. 
European average (25 countries) was 11,3% of GDP in 2004; for the new member 
states it was 11,6%. Shares above the European average are noticed in many 
countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Iceland, UK, Norway and Ireland. High quotas ranging from 19% for Finland, 
25% for Sweden and to almost 33% are shown for Denmark. Shares of less than 
5% are given for Cyprus, Greece and Malta, which are the least decentralized 
countries. The similar results shown up if sub-national revenues are compared to 
General Government Revenues. The highest shares are evident for the Nordic 
countries: Denmark (58%), Sweden (43%) and Finland (35,9%) and for the 
Czech Republic (30%), Hungary (28,7%), Italy (33%), Poland (33,6%) and the 
UK(31,5%). In Cyprus, Greece and Malta sub-national government is of minor 
importance comparing sub-national revenues to General Government revenues 
and amount less than 7.5%. Results for Croatia bring to the conclusion that it is 
relatively centralized country. In 2004 the share of sub-national budget revenues 
in consolidated revenues of the general government budget totalled 11,2% and 
their share in GDP amounted to 5,2%. Those values increased in 2007: 17,1% of 
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6. FISCAL EQUALIZATION MODEL 
A vertical fiscal imbalance occurs when the revenues of different sub-
national levels of government do not match their expenditure responsibilities. A 
horizontal fiscal imbalance occurs when different sub-national units have 
different abilities to provide services due to different abilities to raise funds.  
In Croatia evident is the constant increase of the number of towns and 
municipalities without the sufficient capacity to provide mandatory services to 
their citizens. More than 35% of local and regional government units have been 
unable to cover their operating expenses without grants.  
The system of fiscal equalization  in Croatia is based upon following 
instruments for : 
1. vertical fiscal  equalization :  
- tax  sharing;  
- an additional share of income tax for 53 units that carry out certain 
decentralized       
- functions; 
- Equalization fund; 
2. horizontal fiscal equalization:  
- tax sharing (special treatment of areas of special national concern and 
islands) 
- current and capital grants.  
Since tax sharing mechanism is used as vertical and horizontal fiscal 
equalization instrument all examples for which Croatian government use it, in its 
attempt to alleviate fiscal imbalances among sub-national units, will be explained 
hereinafter. 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT or profit tax) was shared between different 
government levels till January 2007 in following percentages: for central 
government 70%, for counties 10% and 20% for cities and municipalities. Since 
the corporate income tax had been paid where the headquarters of firms were 
located, the most of revenues of this tax was collected in Zagreb while the 
remaining sub-national units had received low share of revenues from CIT. 
Sharing rates for Real Estate Transfer Tax are: 40% for central 
government and 60% for cities and municipalities. 
The revenue realized through Personal Income Tax is distributed in a 
manner that distinguishes whether local unit finances or not decentralized public 
services and with respect to the special area that a local government unit belongs 
to. So we distinguish 4 different types of income tax revenue distribution: 
standard distribution, distribution in the capital city Zagreb, which has the county 
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status as well, and distribution in areas of special national concern (ASNC): in 
war damaged areas, hill and mountain areas and insular regions (table 5). 
 
Since capital city Zagreb has a status of county it gets share of 52% as a 
city, 15% as county and 12% belongs to it because it has been taken over the 
financing of decentralized functions. All together is 79%. 
 
Table 5.  










ASNC  Cities and 
municipalities 
on islands 
County 15% 10% 15% 
Municipality/city 52% 90% 73% 
Government level 







 / 12% 
Equalization fund 21% 21% / / 
Source: Author’s systematization 
 
Cities and municipalities in the areas of special national concern have to 
finance all decentralized functions from the received revenue (90% of PIT 
revenues). Counties get only 10% which is usually not sufficient for covering the 
mandatory obligations transferred for a given decentralized function.  
In order to protect the islands from emigration and in order to stimulate 
rapid demographic and economic development, since 2003 the Government has 
been giving incentives for the development of insular local government units. 
These incentives were introduced for the purchase or lease of agricultural land, 
for water supply capital projects, physical planning and improvement of the 
traffic and transportation infrastructure. Those  municipalities  and  cities  on  the  
islands  that  make  joint  agreements  about  the financing of capital projects in 
their area are exempt from payment of share of PIT in Equalization Fund (21%). 
That amount becomes the revenue of stated cities and municipalities (52% 
+21%= 73%), 15% goes to county and 12% to level of government that took on 
decentralized functions. 
For local government units that took on the financing of the 
decentralized functions, since 2001 central  government has been provided  a  
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larger share of income tax. The size of local units’ shares in income tax are 
determined according to the extent of provision of decentralized functions 
(primary and secondary education, welfare and health care and fire protection) 
that given units undertake (table 6). 
 
Table 6. 
An additional share of income tax for units that carry out certain decentralized 
functions 
 
Decentralized function  2006 2007 
elementary education  2,9% 3,1% 
Secondary education  2,0% 2,2% 
      Welfare 
Welfare centres  0,4% 0,5% 
Homes for the elderly and infirm  1,6% 1,7% 
Health care: establishments owned by the 
county  
2,5% 3,2% 
      Fire fighting   up to 8,0%  1,3% 
Source: Author’s systematization 
 
Additionally, the sub-national self-government units that took on the 
financing of the decentralized functions, but are not able to finance them from the 
revenue obtained from income tax and additional share in income tax, have the 
right to receive an equalization grant for decentralized functions from the state 
budget, up to the amount of the minimum standards established in the decrees and 
the decisions of the government on the minimal financial standards for respective 
decentralized functions that are transferred to them.  
The criteria and standards for equalization grants for decentralized 
functions in selected public services have been set out for the current fiscal year 
on the basis of expenditures in the previous fiscal year, along with the state 
budget The gross grant, thus calculated, is reduced by the amount of PIT 
collected for that function in each local government unit, to get the net 
equalization grant for each unit. 
“Equalization Fund” is financed with 21% share of Personal Income Tax 
(PIT) collections. We should mention that in 2006 only 345 local government 
units took part in filling this Fund. Other 225  local governments that have a 
special status in financing  (areas  of  special  national  concern,  hill  and  
mounting  areas  and  insular  local  government)  didn’t  participate. 7  
Because of huge disparities among local units in demographic structure, 
economic development and fiscal capacity large number of local units is not able 
                                                 
7Annual Report  for 2006, Ministry of finance, Zagreb, 2007, p. 94. ( available on www.mfin.hr)  
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to raise enough own sources to finance obligations within their sphere of 
competences. Therefore special laws and programmes define incentive measure 
for their recovery and development.  
Besides for alleviation of vertical fiscal imbalances tax sharing has been 
used as a horizontal equalization instrument in war-affected areas, areas that are 
under developed or that have demographic problems (ASNC, mountainous and 
hilly areas, on islands). The aim is alleviation of disparities in economic and 
social development among areas and guarantee that minimum needed level of 
public services will be supplied in all local units. 
Horizontal equalization measures are: tax sharing, current/capital 
general grants, capital grants allocated via competent ministries and allocated via 
the Regional Development Fund. 
Considering that revenues from corporate income tax (CIT) belong to 
the central state budget since 2007, the Government has decided to give direct 
incentives from the state budget to the areas of special national concern and hill 
and mountain areas, equal to the amount of CIT they realize on their area.  
Through special treatment of ASNC, hill and mountain areas and insular 
local units (that made joint agreements about financing capital projects) in 
sharing PIT revenues the Government ceded 607 million Kuna in 2006 to those 
areas. That was more than 50% of total collected personal income tax revenue. 
Additionally, in order to avoid financial problems because of personal income tax 
refund the central budget has took over that obligation instead of 111 cities and 
municipalities of I. and II. group of ASNC, 69 municipalities of III. group of 
ASNC and 45 municipalities in hill and mountain areas.8 
 
Grants 
Grant system has to introduce more equity into the system by allowing 
local units to provide uniform levels of service delivery despite the large 
differences in their fiscal capacity. Local budgets receive grants from: foreign 
governments, international organizations and other general government units.  
Considering that the budgetary funds for a large number of local 
government units are insufficient, central government uses two types of grants 
trying to equalize fiscal capacity  
disparities among local units: 
1. general current (non- conditional) grants  
- for the counties  which than allocate grants to the municipalities and 
cities on their area;  
                                                 
8 Annual Report for 2006, Ministry of finance, Zagreb, 2007, p. 92. ( available on www.mfin.hr) 
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- directly for local government units situated in the ASNC, to 
Mountainous regions, and to the Islands and 
2. capital investment grants. 
Their total amount is small. In total realized revenues of 53 local and 
regional self-government units for 2007 the share of grants was 13,8% (chart 5). 
In accordance with GFS methodology, additional share of income tax for 
decentralized functions, given as equalization grant from the state budget, has a 
status of interstate grant. Grants are almost completely realized as intrastate 
grants (table 7.).  
 
Table 7.  
Grants to sub-national units, 2007 (in 000 Kn) 
 
Grants from foreign governments  9.631 
Grants from international organizations  4.447 
Grants from other general government units 2.123.569 
Grants in total 2.137.647 
Source: Ministry of finance 
 
Since 2001, total amount and grants allocation criteria are defined 
annually by the Central Government and the Ministry of Finance, in Budget 
Execution Law. Grants to counties refer to investments in development programs 
of counties, municipalities and cities in the area of county.  Since 2005 the 
Central Government has changed their purpose exclusively for capital investment 
in development programs of counties, towns and municipalities. 
The criteria for the calculation of the grants for counties are the 
following9: 
• the number of inhabitants according to the 2001 census, 
• the average revenues of the county budget in the previous year per capita 
on national level (national average) 
• the revenues of the county budget  in the previous year per county 
inhabitant, 
• the number of inhabitants of Republic of Croatia (without Zagreb) per 
km2 territorial area of Republic of Croatia (national average) 
• the number of inhabitants of particular county per km2 county area. 
Counties are obliged to allocate a certain share of those grants to the 
cities and municipalities that are not direct grant beneficiaries. That share has 
been changed: in 2003 it was at least 30%, in 2004 at least 50% and since 2005 at 
least 75%. So, only 25% of specific purpose grants (for capital spending except 
                                                 
9 Budget Execution Law, Article 39, (OG 28/08)  
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for purchase of personal vehicles) remain to the counties. The County assembly 
stipulates the criteria for the allocation of parts of these grants. 
Direct grants to municipalities and cities can be used only for financing 
material and energy expenditures and investment in capital projects. 
The criteria for the calculation of the grants for municipalities and cities 
in areas of special government concern are the following: 
• the number of inhabitants according to the 2001 census, 
• the average income of municipality and city per capita on national level 
(national average) in previous year, 
• the average income per capita of the group on the areas of special 
government concern, (specific municipality or city), 
• the number of inhabitants per km2 at the level of I. and II. group of 
ASNC (group average) 
• the number of inhabitants per km2  of particular municipality and the city 
• the share of expenditure for capital programs in previous year as part of 
the total expenditure, 
• rationale of the execution of the system functions (employment numbers, 
expenditure per employee) 
•  and the expenditure for the functions of the city (up to 30.000 
inhabitants) in previous year. 
Apart from direct fund transfer, resources are made available for local 
and regional self-government units from line ministries and other government 
agencies, including Croatian Waters and the Regional Development Fund. 
Mainly, this involves the co-financing of the development programs through 




Sub-national governments in Croatia can borrow only for investments 
financed from its own budget. The borrowing of lower government tiers is 
regulated by the Budget Law. They can take on debt to the decision of the 
representative body of LGU with the prior consent of the Government of 
Republic of Croatia. Short term borrowing of LGUs is possible for the financing 
of the regular activities only when the revenue of the budget does not come in 
evenly all through the year. 
In Croatia, according to the article 106 of the Budget Law (OG 96/03), 
the annual debt service payment limit is 20 percent of local governments’ 
revenues realized in the preceding year. The amount of total borrowing limit 
includes the amount of the annual loan annuity, liabilities regarding issuing 
securities, and guarantees from previous years, as well as all unpaid liabilities. 
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The Government and the Ministry of Finance introduced an additional restriction 
in 2004 and local governments can now take on debt up to at most 2,3% of the 
totally realized operating revenue of all local governments (article 12. the Budget 
Execution Law, OG 137/06 and 28/08). This limit is ineffective because many 
good investment projects could stay unrealized because of this constraint. 
The most typical form of borrowing in Croatia is commercial bank loan, 
because financial management and personnel are not skilled and they do not 
know how to use different financing sources. Many small local units are not able 
to borrow because of the lack of technical capacity and higher fixed costs of 
borrowing and financial management and personnel in those sub-national units 
are not skilled. 
There is a little initiative for borrowing by the issue of municipal bonds. 
Only six sub-national governments (Istria County, Opatia, Zadar, Koprivnica, 
Rijeka and Split) issued bonds, mainly for the  financing  of  infrastructure 
projects and to meet liabilities to suppliers. Local units choose this type of 
borrowing when they are, because of the amount of needed money, not capable to 
take a loan in commercial bank or when they want to expand basis of creditors. 
The bond issuing lasts longer, because of the Government borrowing restrictions, 
and is more costly then taking commercial bank loan, so the bond issuing under 5 




The process of fiscal decentralization in Croatia has started quite 
recently, in 2001, and has experienced a number of significant changes since 
than, but the conclusion of this paper, based on the analysis of expenditure and 
financing dimension of decentralization process, is that Croatia is still highly 
centralised country.   
The values of four important indicators: the share of revenue and 
expenditure of sub-national governments in GDP and the share of revenues and 
expenditures of sub-national governments in the total government budget 
revenues and expenditures, confirms the fact that very low degree of 
decentralization has been achieved in Croatia in past few years, although it has 
been emphasized as priority government reform in programmes of all political 
options.  
Still no formal paper has been adopted in the sense of a strategy to 
define the objectives, principles, effects and the procedure of decentralization. All 
these elements are to some extend contained in the separate, ambiguous and 
numerous laws and in the bylaws regulations. Single law should contain clear and 
specific expenditure and revenue assignment among the different levels of 
government. 
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Croatian territorial organization, with total number of 577 local 
government units, indicates the fragmentation problem which has inevitable 
negative consequences such as higher costs of service provision and disparities of 
social, economic and demographic conditions among jurisdictions. Such 
administration resulted in their inefficiency because of an increased number of 
local units whose finances, staff and organization are not capable to provide local 
public services. Changes in the number of local government units are inevitable. 
This suggests the need of amalgamation and/or of cooperation among local units. 
It is necessary to establish clear and measurable criteria for local government 
units to meet preconditions to get status of respective LGU.  
Additional problem is vague division of affairs and functions and 
entangled financial relationships between different levels of government. It is 
very difficult to say which government level undertakes a given function and the 
functions of local units are overlapping. Almost all functions are financed from 
both central and local government levels. Since sub-national expenditure 
assignments typically exceed revenue assignments, the central government still 
plays the major role in the system of sub-national financing because the majority 
of local and regional revenues come from its transfers to sub-national units, 
mainly in the form of shared taxes. The fact that only 53 (20 counties, the city of 
Zagreb and  23  municipalities  and  cities) of total 577 local government units,  
have assumed  the  obligation  of  financing  the  decentralized  functions confirm 
the thesis of this paper that the decentralization process is not successfully 
implemented in Croatia and that the need for new reform is priority. These 53 
local government units, that assumed the financing of the decentralized functions, 
participate with 70-80% in total revenues of all local government units. 
The fiscal equalization mechanism system, based mainly on tax-sharing 
mechanism,  is not effective enough because it causes the reliance of sub-national 
units on transfers from higher levels of government to finance their spending 
instead of being stimulated to improve the efficiency of own revenue collection, 
especially in 180 local units that have status of regions of special national 
concern. The criteria for the calculation of grants for local and regional self-
government changes every year and that there is no specific consideration of 
expenditure needs, which causes additional problems in expenditure and 
development planning process of local units. 
Further improvements must be done in encouragement of local 
government’s fiscal autonomy in raising revenues from own sources and 
autonomy in exercising delegated functions. Central government must create 
enabling conditions that allow local units to take on more responsibilities. Weak 
administrative and technical capacity at local levels has resulted in less efficient 
and effective provision of public services in some areas of the country. Therefore 
central government should provide sub-national units assistance in the planning, 
financing and management of decentralized functions.  
 
 




Annual Report  for 2006 and 2007, Ministry of Finance, Zagreb, 2007 
and 2008, (www.mfin.hr) 
Bajo, A., Bronić, M., Procjene učinkovitosti modela fiskalnog izravnanja 
u Hrvatskoj, Financijska teorija i praksa  31(1), Institut za javne financije, Zagreb, 
2007., str 1-24. 
Bauer, H., Rudorf,C., Local Finance in Europe, An Overview 
2000/2005, Centre for Public Administration Research, Innsbruck, 2006 
de Mello, Jr,L. R., Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations: A Cross-Country Analysis, , World Development Vol. 28, No. 2, 2000, 
pp. 365-380  
Mušec, M., Pigey, J., Compliance of the Croatian Legislative 
Framework with the European Charter of Local Self-government, USAID, The 
Urban Institute, Zagreb, 2005. 
The Budget Law (O.G. 96/03) 
The Budget Execution Law (O.G. 137/06 and 28/08) 
Law on Financing of Local and Regional Self-Government (O.G. 
117/93., 66/97., 33/00., 127/00., 59/01., 107/01., 150/02., 147/03. i 132/06.) 
Law on Local and Regional Self-government (O.G. 33/01., 60/01, 
129/05) 



















EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XVIII. (2009) BR. 2. (233-258)             Konjhodžić, H., Šuman Tolić, M.:FISCAL... 
 
 258 
Dr. sc. Konjhodžić Halid 
Redoviti professor 
Odjel za ekonomiju i poslovnu ekonomiju 
Sveučilište u Dubrovniku 
 
Mr. sc. Šuman Tolić Meri 
Asistent 
Odjel za ekonomiju i poslovnu ekonomiju 
Sveučilište u Dubrovniku 
 
 
FISKALNA DECENTRALIZACIJA- REFORMSKI PROCES 




U radu se raspravlja o pitanjima vezanim za proces decentralizacije u Hrvatskoj. 
Iako je postala omiljeni reformski prioritet među hrvatskim političarima svih 
opcija, vrijednosti pokazatelja ostvarenja fiskalne decentralizacije potvrđuju 
činjenicu da je njena realizacija  na vrlo niskom  stupnju. U radu se ističu 
osnovna obilježja hrvatskog sustava fiskalne decentralizacije i mjere koje je 
neophodno poduzeti za uspješnu implementaciju i ostvarenje koristi od 
decentralizacije. Zaključci su zasnovani na analizi odgovornosti za poslove 
prenesene na djelokrug lokalnih/regionalnih jedinica i prihoda koji se ostvaruju 
na različitim državnim razinama, te na izračunu nekih najčešće korištenih 
pokazatelja za procjenu dostignutog stupanja decentralizacije. Zaključak 
naglašava važnost odvijanja procesa decentralizacije na način koji osigurava 
financijsku autonomiju jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave, 
kako bi one mogle preuzeti financiranje decentraliziranih funkcija. 
Ključne riječi: decentralizacija, prijenos odgovornosti za pružanje javnih 
usluga, prijenos financijskih sredstava, pomoći, sustav izravnavanja, 
pokazatelji  fiskalne decentralizacije 
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